

Introduction

Issues of Asian Portuguese-Speaking Spaces and *Lusotopias*

THis dossier presents the work of the Third International Meeting of *Lusotopie* which was held in Goa from 23 to 26 February 1999, on the theme « Portuguese-Speaking Spaces in Asia, Asians in Portuguese-Speaking Spaces ». It was organised in partnership with the Political Science and Sociology Departments of the University of Goa.

The study of the relationships between Asia and the Portuguese-speaking World, and of the populations considered as being Portuguese-Asian Creoles, is a promising field of research which, in fact, still remains largely unexplored. It is widely thought that the Portuguese-speaking Asian communities are in the process of disappearing : even though the current situation in Timor Loro Sae seems to show the opposite, this field of study has suffered the consequences of these preconceived ideas. It has been the subject of few academic meetings – the seminar organised by the Oriental Institute of the New Lisbon University in May 1994 remains one of the rare examples of such events. Also, it still bears the mark of colonial historiography, its constant evocation of past glories and its neglect of serious study of the present barring a few exceptions. As well as this, it has, without a doubt, suffered from the effects of a wide range of heterogeneous disciplinary and methodological approaches.

This situation led us to mark out the field of study by devoting this Third International Meeting to the study of the relations between Asia and the Portuguese-speaking areas. We will be the first to admit that the title we chose, « Portuguese-Speaking Spaces in Asia, Asians in Portuguese-Speaking Spaces », was not perfect – the first part, in particular, is contestable : *are there* veritable Portuguese-speaking spaces in Asia ? If we are to answer in the affirmative to this question, it supposes that we include in the concept of Portuguese-speaking the various Creoles which,

although historically linked with the Portuguese language, are nonetheless more than simple « forms » of this language and are indeed languages in their own right. Secondly, it also supposes that the Portuguese-speaking space is limited to these communities and does not cover the whole surface area of the former territories, as is too-often the case on maps published in Portugal.

Although « methodologically contestable », the ambitions of this title were twofold : to draw up a profile of the current situation in the countries and territories said to be part of the Portuguese « heritage » in Asia, and to highlight their situation in terms of interaction and of problems of identity and culture. The analysis was to be based on the examination of the link with the Portuguese heritage, be it a source of pride or of conflict. Migration and the diasporas naturally had their place at the heart of this project.

However, although the second part of the title is less contestable (*there are* Asians residing in the Portuguese-speaking countries), we noted that we know all too little about them : there have been a few studies about the Japanese and Koreans of Brazil – Asians who did not speak Portuguese before their arrival in the country – but practically none about the Macanese and *Macaistes* there – Chinese or Chinese-Creole Asians who came from Macao and are thus supposed to have been Portuguese-speakers before emigrating to another Portuguese-speaking country. Likewise, the Goan diaspora which is also, in principle, of Portuguese-speaking origin, and is spread over all the continents and, notably, in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Great Britain, North America) or in countries with English as an official language (East Africa, Hong Kong), has been relatively widely studied, in contrast with the Goans of Portugal or Mozambique – doubtless because the latter are well integrated. The fact that they have become a political issue has led to a multiplication of the number of reports and studies on the young Timorese of Portugal, but we still lack studies on the Timorese of Australia, the Netherlands or Indonesia.

Our approach was organised around three lines of thinking. The first was to make an up-date on the situation in the Asian territories in the light of current affairs : to analyse the process of formation of these territories, to study and compare the existing political movements and to probe into the relationships between these territories and the States of which they are a part. The aim was to make an update on problems of language, urban or religious forms so as to underline any role they might have as markers of identity. This approach was intended to lead to a deeper understanding of the Portuguese-Asian Creole populations, of their dynamics and social configurations.

The second axis of our exploration was that of the Portuguese-speaking world as a space for immigration and circulation of Asians. By showing the role of the people, we also expected to be able to highlight the complex bonds woven between the different Asian communities in the Portuguese-speaking areas. Finally, our intention in this part was to place problems of a political nature in historical perspective.

Our third axis was to study the policy of the Asian countries with regard to the Portuguese-speaking countries, in other words, to analyse the relations and the international issues involving Asia and the Portuguese-speaking world.

The reality – organisation of the Meeting in Goa, the participation of colleagues of several different Asian nationalities, including a large proportion of Indians from Goa – was to bring about distinct modifications in the objectives announced at the outset when making our call for contributions. Other problems appeared to us, contributing to a widening of the scope of debate, to a rethinking of the methodological approaches and to the suggestion of new directions for research.

The shortcomings of this dossier can be judged in the light of the above : they highlight contradictions and imbalances, as well as a certain lack of comparative thought in political science, thus showing the extent of the tasks which still await us. Despite all our combined efforts, we did not get, for example, contributions on the subject of political issues in Macao (just when retrocession was approaching !). We also expected more participants to deal with the subject of political life in Goa¹ and to provide systematic, in-depth study of the nature of its links with Portuguese-speaking culture. Coming as it did at the time of the controversial acknowledgement of the anniversary of the arrival of Vasco de Gama in India, it was not by chance that we opted for a partnership between Goa and *Lusotopie*. Of course, the aim was partly to launch a fruitful collaboration and to compare academic approaches, but it was also to study territories which bear the marks of a specific history in a rigorous manner, while rejecting the ideological instrumentalisation of the colonial past : the history of Portuguese expansion and its present-day consequences – no matter how they are judged – are a part of the joint patrimony of humanity.

Goa, the Missing Paradigm ?

As you will note in this dossier, the question of the specific nature of the Goan identity was omnipresent in the papers presented, and denunciations of the colonial heritage often encroached upon the field of contemporary political analysis. We received few responses concerning relations between the parties in Goa and their counterparts in the rest of the Union, while the role of the Catholic social milieus in the political life of the State remains to be examined. However, when assessing the idea of governance, the political life of Goa or of Macao cannot be explained merely in terms of hierarchy, of power networks or of information circuits. They are only possible if there is a minimum level of trust (variable over the centuries) and *entente* (which applies only to a part of the populations), and therefore of *identification* between the partners.

In Goa, however, one always gets the impression that, in a certain way, de-colonisation has not yet been « digested ». It is in no way a question of regretting the departure of the Portuguese, with the exception of a very small number of cases : but why, then, do some berate Portuguese colonisation so strongly ? What is the function of this denunciation ? The elements of the answer to this must be put forward from two distinct points of view.

1. See the article by P.R. DESOUSA, « Political Life in the State of Goa, 1987-1999 », elsewhere in this volume : 31-45 ; as well as M.L. Bravo da Costa RODRIGUES, « The Status of Portuguese Language and Some Other Cultural Aspects in Goa » : 597-609, and Raghuraman S. TRICHUR, « Politics of Goan Historiography » : 637-644.

On the one hand, is the rest of India forcing the Goans to « prove » that they really are Indians? We get the impression that the Portuguese language, almost totally absent in the spoken language but very present in thousands of other ways, is constantly suspected of having colonialist connotations, whereas the English heritage, although infinitely more powerful, is, precisely because it is so banal and « normal », no longer even noticed! So-called English-speaking India is thus said to be « Indian », while the State of Goa is still a bit « Portuguese ».

On the other hand, is the persistent denunciation, in India and in Goa itself, of Portuguese colonial rule which came to an end more than forty years ago, not being used as a blind to hide internal political divisions? There are therefore no enemies within, and only the enemies without need be stigmatised: as a result, divisions in the local political field are not acceptable... This vision would still seem to be the credo of some in the generation which lived through 1961-62².

This is obviously due to the weight of the historical context of the liberation of Goa – a liberation and diplomatic struggle that culminated in a military encounter between India and Portugal over Goa – but it creates the need for constant self-justification on the part of Goans whose own identity is always being brought into question³. However, the context of 1962 does not suffice to explain everything.

In fact, although the « identity tension » observed in Goa is in no way synonymous with identity-based fragility, the opposite trend is appearing today, loudly claiming the Portuguese heritage (*cf. below*) and we must note that this anguish is hardly visible elsewhere, even in tragic cases: the Timorese are lay proud claim to links with Portugal, as do the Kristangs of Malacca and the « true Portuguese » in the depths of Bengal, while the Macanese no longer think much about it (if they ever did) – the Burghers of Sri Lanka could perhaps be an intermediate case. The Goan identity tension is also due to the enormous weight, in relation to the population of the State of Goa, of the historically-rooted phenomenon of the diaspora which imposes a constant quest for identity. The exile of many Timorese, although large-scale, is still short (twenty-five years) in historical terms and is thus not comparable.

The twenty-one papers collected here thus cast light, more particularly, on two recurrent, transversal questions which are inherent to the problem of identity. The first is the question of language, linked with the status of the Portuguese language in Asia. The second concerns the role of the cultural heritage which is much more important than the restricted space.

A Key Question – the Social Status of the Language

The question of the Portuguese language in the former Asian territories is a very complex one and has often been based on a carefully-maintained

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2. This can remind us somewhat of the attitudes of Algerian leaders and of the Third-Worldists in relation to the newly independent Algeria: all the difficulties were due to the colonial heritage, there were no internal divisions...
 3. It would be interesting, in this respect, to carry out a comparative study of the identity of Pondicherry: as the retrocession of Pondicherry and the other French trading posts was carried out by peaceful means, what are the consequences today in terms of identity and the attitude of English-speaking India to the town?

illusion. For historical reasons which are linked with the vicissitudes of Portuguese conquest and the many different forms of Portuguese domination, « lusophony » (areas where Portuguese is spoken) doesn't mean « lusography » (areas where Portuguese is written). The situation is one of many contrasts – today, in Asia, there are a dozen (or perhaps more) Creole languages with a Portuguese lexical basis – and we will note four paradigmatic situations.

How can we explain that, in the cities of Goa and Macao which underwent « five centuries of colonisation », the Portuguese language is non-existent and that the other aspects of the Portuguese heritage are either decried (Goa) or ignored (Macao) ? How can we explain the fact that, in Malacca, an area colonised by the Portuguese for barely sixty years, this identity is, in contrast, claimed, even though Portuguese-Malay Kristang is losing ground ? And how can we explain the fact that, in Timor, the Portuguese language is gaining ground rapidly and is even emerging in certain zones where it has never been spoken before ?

In Goa, a State of 1,169,000 inhabitants, whose literacy rate was 30.5 % in 1960 (24 % in the Indian Union), Portuguese, the language of the mixed *reinóis* and *luso-descendentes* elites, was overthrown politically in 1962. It was replaced by English, followed by two national languages, Konkani, the traditional language of Goa, and Marathi (spoken by 60.7 million people in the neighbouring State of Maharashtra). Today, only those members of the élites who lived at the time of colonisation are likely to speak Portuguese and even for this very small minority, this does not mean that this is the language they use at home. In the specific case of Goa, the language, that decisive factor in collective feeling, bears witness to the difficulties experienced in overcoming a certain « colonial complex ». But the reason why it was possible for Federal India – after some initial hesitation, it must be said⁴ – to overthrow Portuguese politically, *it was because the social basis of the Portuguese language was already greatly reduced during the last years of colonial domination*. The proportion of « Portuguese-speakers » in 1960 was somewhere around just one percent, a fact that can seem astonishing after « five centuries of colonisation ». To understand this early decline, we have to go back to the history of the 18th and 19th centuries, that is to say to the long period of economic decline – is the « independence » of Mozambique, separated from Goa in 1753, not a sign of this ? The elites of Goa, the most widely Portuguese-speaking part of the population, underwent large-scale emigration, either towards Portugal and Mozambique, or, above all, to British India, often in the colonial administration, due to the fact that they were the only ones able to handle the Latin alphabet ! We can at least put forward the hypothesis that this emigration constituted a continual bleeding of the social milieus of Goa which were most likely to speak Portuguese. From there, these elites emigrated once again, either in the colonial administration or in trading activities, as far inland as Uganda and, of course, to Kenya, Zanzibar and Tanganyika. From there, they headed towards Canada (notably those from the Uganda of Idi Amin Dada) or to London etc. More recently, the Persian Gulf has become a favourite destination. This dispersion has not destroyed the feeling of belonging, which has survived through other means than the language. But

4. Some publications in the Portuguese language continued for a few years after 1962.

conversely, it is therefore impossible to explain the crisis of the Portuguese language in Goa if we date it back only to 1962. It is a long-term historical process which shows us *that Portuguese has not been the main social way by which the Goan identity has been maintained.*

Macao, the Latin Quarter of Zuhai ?

In Macao, the legal status of the Portuguese language conferred on it, until retrocession in 1999, a level of visibility which was inversely proportional to its legitimacy in daily life. A reduced population and a tiny surface area (20 km²) make it impossible to compare with the State of Goa, which itself is small on the Indian scale.

A year after the transfer of the administration to China, the way the Economic Administrative Region of Macao (EARM) is managed reveals a certain lack of definition. This may be due to the inexperience of the new middle-management, but also to the silent surveillance they feel subject to. The fraction of Portuguese who have decided to stay are clearly aware that the language of power is no longer that of Camões or Jorge Amado, and they feel marginalized, even though this may not be a deliberate political move by those in power. The economic question is crucial but far from new : what specific orientation likely to form an identity should be given to an administrative region of 20 km²? The last years of the Portuguese administration showed the same hesitations : the renovation of the architectural patrimony may have been clearly visible and positive, but was unlikely to maintain Portuguese influence for much longer. The few Portuguese attempts to demand that the territory have two official languages were so unrealistic that they did not last long in negotiations⁵.

Rather like Portugal, which, when it entered the European Community (1986), attempted to invent an « African » role for itself, with Lisbon as the gateway to (Portuguese-speaking) Africa, it was said that Macao would be the gateway between China and the Latin world. But, in the same way that English, French, Italian, German and Spanish companies had no need of Portugal to go and exploit Angolan oil, China did not need Macao for its links with the « Latin world ». In any case, the town of the *Leal Senado*⁶ cannot use this function as an identity vector, but at best as a tourist resource⁷.

As Almeida Serra notes, not without humour,

« ...it would seem that the Leal Senado has become no more than a "Câmara municipal provisória"⁸, which in itself is running the risk of becoming a "Junta de freguesia definitiva"⁹... One of the fundamental reasons for this is that although with Portugal there were a few reasons for Macao to have an international status, with China things are not so clear, as Beijing has shown signs of refusing to see an international influence similar to that which Macao had under the Portuguese administration. This is not at all

5. This paragraph is largely inspired by an internal memo of the Centro de estudos africanos e do desenvolvimento, of the Higher Economic Institute of Lisbon, written by A.M. de Almeida SERRA: *Macao*, CESA-ISEG, December 2000, 2 p. mimeo.

6. *Leal Senado*, the ancient local legislative assembly.

7. About the portuguese restaurants in Macao, see L. AUGUSTIN-JEAN, « Cuisine et identité macanaise », *Lusotopie 1998* : 91-103.

8. *Câmara municipal provisória*, provisional municipal council.

9. *Junta de freguesia definitiva*, definitive district committee.

surprising, but does contribute to the rationale of the "Junta de freguesia" or the "Latin quarter" (of Zuhai ?) which seems to be setting in... »¹⁰.

All this is most certainly true. And yet, if the Portuguese language had been of any use whatsoever to the population of that region, small as it was, the political context would have been different. As far as we know, the English language is no closer to disappearing from Hong Kong – and not for merely economic reasons, or if this is the case, then perhaps because the economic reasons have had effects on identity, including political identity. But although Hong Kong experienced political pluralism very late (under its last governor), at least the Anglo-Saxon press always managed to penetrate it. This was not the case in Macao, which went from one single party to another, with no more than a barely discernible, faraway whiff of the carnation. So the Portuguese language could not be socially useful to the Macanese identity, which, with the exception of the rare Creole families, was in any case no more than a regional identity, neither ethnic, religious, nor communitarian.

Malacca : *Bumiquest* and tourism

How can it be explained, then, that the community which originated from the few hundred Portuguese left behind by Alfonso of Albuquerque in 1511, and which then went through successive mixing of races, is still alive and speaking *Cristao/Kristang* ? Clearly, social reasons are behind this strange longevity of the very small Melaka group : religion, of course, with its festivals, has been a socially structuring factor, as has probably been the preferred traditional profession (sea fishing).

In Goa, Gerard Fernandis, himself Portuguese-Malay, said : « Now we will not disappear, because the government has realised that it is good for tourism ». It is true that the *Portuguese Settlement* in Ujong Pasir (Melaka) has the specific purpose of providing a place for « identity reconstruction », typical of the phenomena of instrumental re-traditionalization¹¹. But identity reconstructions only work if a minimum of social substratum remains, and it cannot be for only sightseeing reasons that the Malaysian government has agreed to discuss the status of *bumiquest*, the status of officially recognised national (and Christian) minority, something that is not entirely without political risk in a Muslim country.

Timor Loro Sae in the Escudo Zone ?

On the other hand, several interventions have emphasised the importance of the Portuguese language in East Timor. In 1975, it actually *became* a vector of resistance in the face of the Indonesian invader, within an identity-based complex that was indissociable from religion and comparable to what happened in Poland or in Euskadi. The situation is all the more interesting in that the language, like the Portuguese administration, was only really « implanted » on the island in the early 20th

10. M.A. de Almeida SERRA, *Macau, op. cit.* : 1.

11. See, notably, on the official tourist site of Malacca, the page « Portuguese-Eurasian » (<http://www.melaka.gov.my/tourism/culture/portugese.html>).

century. After 1975, Indonesian power managed to evince Portuguese, which then survived in private and religious spheres. The currently prevailing situation indisputably leaves it a last chance in this part of the world : far from being a bland relic of colonialism, the return to Timor of the language of Camões looks more like cultural revenge. There are far more Catholics and far more Portuguese-speakers today in Timor than there were in 1973 (last full colonial year) and in 1975 (year of the invasion).

However, we would be wrong to underestimate the difficulties : although the relentless Portuguese-speaking effort by the Catholic Church was strengthened by the political decision of the Resistance to adopt Portuguese as the official language of the new State, it must not be forgotten that many young Timorese cannot speak either Portuguese or Tetum

(the only traditional language with a relative majority), instead speaking Javanese. As well as this, we must study the link between the population and the more mixed, more Creole, more Portuguese-speaking elite : is it not possible that social tensions may also hide tensions in terms of identity ? Finally, in psycho-pedagogical terms, if official Portuguese were to prohibit the use of Tetum or other traditional languages in places where they are the mother tongues, it would be a form of cultural oppression, typical of the paradigms of authoritarian modernism. It remains to be seen whether the Timor nationalists will repeat or avoid the errors made by the African nationalists in former Portuguese colonies, who long extolled « the all-Portuguese way » in a technocratic and anti-ethnic vision of national unification.

However, there is no doubt that, over the last twenty-five years and for the foreseeable future, the strength of Portuguese in Timor has been and will remain its *social utility* in the regional political context, an « identity safety » factor. This is also why the Timorese leaders speak of membership of the Lomé Convention and of the ACP countries (Asia-Caribbean-Pacific), or even an organic link between their currency and the Escudo and so, very soon and via the Portuguese treasury, the Euro¹², making a « geopolitical voluntarism » likely to counterbalance the two oversized neighbours Australia and Indonesia. From the language to the Euro, the question is one and the same.

Whether it has disappeared (Goa), is disappearing (Macao), is just holding on in a Creole form (Sri Lanka, Melaka, etc.) or is getting stronger (Timor), the presence of the Portuguese language (or of Portuguese-speaking Creoles) in Asia is not so much a « linguistic » matter as one of social identities.

The Virtual Empire

By successive touches, this dossier shows the disproportion between the small size of the territories (Goa is only 3,702 km², Macao covers less than 20 km², Malacca 1,650 km², Timor Loro Sae less than 15,000 km² and Sri Lanka barely 65,000 km²) and, in most cases, the vitality of their specific cultures. The way these cultures have lasted seems all the more impressive

12. This was the choice of the government of Cape Verde.

in that the « attached » countries – China, Malaysia, Indonesia or India – are giants, with huge cultural weight and an often aggressive ethnic nationalism.

It would nevertheless be wrong to overestimate the « Portuguese heritage » factor in understanding the vitality of Portuguese-Asian cultures. It is no more than one of its components, even though in some territories such as Timor, it seems to have acquired a great importance owing to the political role adopted by the Catholic Church.

Whatever the case, if genuine Portuguese-speaking Asia does exist, it fits the definition given by the Portuguese essayist Eduardo Lourenço of Portuguese speaking in general: a *specific area of intersection with other identities*, and not a dilatation of « Portugueseness »¹³.

Nevertheless, a few studies presented in this dossier show that in Timor, as in Malacca or India, the concept of « Portuguese heritage » is now subject, to varying degrees, to an identity-based and political recovery. This can be seen as the end of the colonial complex and a reverse trend to that discussed above regarding « Indo-Anglophone » pressure on Goa. It is seen through the claim for a « Portuguese patrimony » supposed to give the Christian minorities a political representation which seems to have been denied them in their country. In Malaysia as in India, the central government remains keen to balance out inter-religious tensions, not hesitating to consecrate cultural particularities: the derogatory status granted by India to the State of Jammu-et-Cachemire (Muslim majority) or to Nagaland, which has a strong Christian presence like Goa, prove this.

The process of appropriation – which only concerns the Portuguese heritage and excludes Dutch and English – also serves the purposes of the identity reconstruction of more limited social groups. The Christians of the village of Mirpur, in Bengal, who are probably distant descendants of the Portuguese mercenaries who spread throughout the region in the 16th century, claim an imaginary Portuguese identity which, associated with the European model – therefore with development – enhances their value in the local Indian society, thereby compensating for the subordination of the community and the rejection of its members, considered as *Backward*. Backed by an endogenous memory focused on the group itself, the identity reconstruction of this dominated group is apparently achieved following the traditional process of memorising the trials and tribulations that have ensured the cohesion of the community. But reconstruction simultaneously requires the production of a mythical, imaginary and conquering memory, and an invented belonging to the Portuguese empire... This identity reconstruction could be compared to that of certain Muslims in Daman and Diu, former Portuguese trading posts in Gujarat, annexed by the Union in 1961 (112 km², 101,000 inhab.), which claim a « Portuguese heritage » but one which in their case does not coincide with the practice of Christianity.

We can see that, unlike Portuguese-speaking, the concept of *lusotopia* applies perfectly to the formerly Portuguese Asia. Aside from in Timor, perhaps, and in the very small communities that maintain Portuguese Creole, there is hardly any sense in talking of Portuguese-speaking when the majority of the population can neither understand nor speak the language. But the Portuguese heritage is an integral part of the identity

13. Of course, the same can be said of the French-speaking and English-speaking worlds, etc.

genesis, via religion¹⁴, myths, social training, festivals, with many traces in material culture, cooking or even alcohol... This is a case of *lusotopias*, places, spaces and paths of identity produced by a multitude of factors, including the Portuguese factor. Lusotopia does not, however, create communities – if indeed Portuguese-speaking does¹⁵: a Timorese would hardly feel he had any points in common with a Goan, and there was not much mobilisation of solidarity in Goa during the massacres of the pro-Indonesian militia following the referendum in Timor... Nevertheless, certain references which are *common but not shared*, exist in the imagination. It is therefore not impossible that this will have modest political effects in the future, when the problems of de-colonization have been cloaked in the fog of the distant past.

Asians in Portuguese-Speaking Spaces

Asian migrations obviously involve other identity dynamics, born or reformulated on contact with the Portuguese-speaking cultures which received them (Mozambique, Portugal, Brazil...). The comparison of several literary, historical, geographical or anthropological views provides, above all, a picture of the cultural flexibility of emigration. A good example of this is the Hindus. Perceived as being stratified due to the presence of the notion of caste, their emigration shows great abilities to adapt. This is perhaps due to the fact that, with recent changes, the caste refers more to an identification with a community (in the ethnic sense), which is experienced as an interest group within the public space, than as an unchanging social system with hierarchic and ritualistic dimensions?

No doubt we will not observe a specific paradigm of integration (or communitarianisation) of Asian communities in Portuguese-speaking countries which is different from that in other countries¹⁶. Firstly because the « truly lusophone » countries (Portugal, Brazil) are themselves very different. Secondly – and partially in contradiction with the above – because the history of the State in the zone of Portuguese political tradition (including Africa) brings these States closer to the other « Latin », or should we say « Roman » traditions, due to the historical role of Catholicism in the genesis of a levelling form of universalism. Admittedly, French Jacobinism is not the same as the Brazilian « fusion of three races », but both, mythically, have the objective of making distinct identities disappear. The « Roman » nature of these States is, without a doubt, as important as their linguistic natures (French, Portuguese-speaking etc.) in their relationship with immigration.

14. ... which is not even always Catholic, as has been seen with the Protestants of Mirpur or the Muslims of Diu.

15. Speaking Portuguese obviously creates a relative community feeling which can become a political factor (as was shown by the creation of the CPLP in Lisbon in 1996, the Stet of Timor being one of its members). However, in the United States, no solidarity is observed between Brazilians, Portuguese, Goans and Cape Verdians, for example. The language (when they do actually speak the language) is one thing, social experience is another.

16. ... with the exception of the Asian communities which already spoke Portuguese and were already integrated into Portuguese life (*cf. above* the most widely Portuguese-speaking Goan élites who emigrated to Portugal and succeeded in being integrated).

However, there is no doubt that, subject as they are to reconstructed, plural or diverse memories, these Asian immigrations have drawn a new cultural geography in the Portuguese-speaking space which will now have to be taken into account in all research.

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