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The Ascendance of Angoche

The Politics of Kinship and Territory in Nineteenth Century Northern Mozambique

This paper deals with the nineteenth century history of the northern Mozambican territory called Angoche. The name « Angoche » is a proper name given by the Portuguese to the archipelago consisting of a cluster of islands, which appears on many maps as one piece of land despite the fact that each island can be reached only by water[1]. Historically, other islands, such as Puga-Puga, Kiziwa Sultani Hassan (renamed by the Portuguese Mafamede), and Moma were also considered a part of the political unit called the Sultanate of Angoche. The coastal settlements nearest to Angoche and Moma were considered vassal territories of the Angoche sultans. Although the people that were under Angoche political or economic influence were ethnically diverse, the ethnic name of the inhabitants of Angoche Islands proper is *Koti.* The Koti are sometimes referred to as « Angochians » in this paper.

Nineteenth century northern Mozambique was marked by major politico-economic changes mainly stemming from its involvement in the international trading systems. The trade in slave and firearms had modified the internal social and political outlook of the region. Slaves for export were shipped to Indian and Atlantic Ocean destinations from ports such as Angoche, and the Sultanate of Angoche expanded its influence into the hinterland and became a major political power in the territory of the modern Nampula Province of Mozambique. This study attempts to reconstruct the history of this expansion on the mainland. It challenges the assumption that Angoche's interests and political orientations were directed mainly towards the Swahili world, while its relations with the mainland were only of the predatory and parasitic character of a slave raider, in which the hinterland people became its passive victims.

The Portuguese conquerors and the historians of Mozambique, such as Nancy Hafkin, Joseph Mbwiliza and Mello Machado, emphasize the Swahili or « Swahilicized » Muslim identities of the Angochians (the Koti ethnic

1. In their book, Schadeberg and Mucanheia indicate that the word Angoche is a Portuguesized version of the old name for the archipelago *Ngoja.* See T. SCHADEBERG & F. MUCANHEIA, *Ekoti: the Maka or Swahili Language of Angoche,* Köln, Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2000.

group) and represent them as culturally alien to the people of the mainland[2]. Instead of focusing on « Swahiliness » and the presumed « foreignness » of the Angochians with respect to the peoples of the interior, this study suggests viewing Angoche as an integral and « organic » part of the region, especially the mainland.

The study emphasizes that the rise of Angoche to supremacy in the region was due to its geographic position, and to its leaders' successful political manoeuvering and strategic reshuffling of the semantics of kinship and territorial relations that are at the base of the political organizations and shared political perceptions of the matrilineal societies of the region. Through these processes, the Angoche *inhapakho* (the alleged first-comers that incorporated the kin of the local paramount chiefs, the *mwene*) became superiors among the paramount chiefs of both the coast and the interior and managed to create networks of trade and reciprocity that extended throughout the region. The Angoche rulers' expansionist politics were directed towards capturing the opportunities offered by the international slave trade and did not aim at building a centralized state, as is frequently assumed among historians[3]. As the supreme *mwene* of the region, the *inhapakho* became land- and wife-givers and were responsible for the spread of Islam on the mainland. Consequently, Angoche became the regional center of Islam, which strengthened its position not only *vis-à-vis* the networks of the Indian Ocean dominated by the Swahili but also the people of the hinterland. The question of the spread of Islam on the mainland is also

2. Eduardo do Couto Lupi was the first Portuguese who collected data on the history, « customs and traditions » of Angoche, and brought local Shirazi oral traditions to the attention of public in 1905. He claimed that Angochians, as descendants of the Arabs and Shirazi Persians, were of « foreign stock » as opposed to the Africans of the interior. Pedro Massano de Amorim, however, who commanded the military conquest of the region between 1906 and 1910, referred to the Angochians as « *os macuas amonhezados do litoral* », meaning Muslim Makwa of the coast underlining their cultural similarity, except for Islam. The only linguistic research done on the Ekoti, the language of the Angoche, has been recently completed by Thilo Schadeberg and Francisco Mucanheia. Among the historians, Mello Machado, Hafkin, Mbwiliza, Capela and Medeiros, Alpers and the Isaacmans refer to the Angochians as Swahili, while Newitt does not. Angoche is not shown as an integral part of the Swahili world either in Derek Nurse and Thomas Spears' or in John Middleton's book on the Swahili. See E. do Couto LUPI, *Angoche. Breve memória sobre uma das Capitanias-Môres do Distrito de Moçambique,* Lisbon, Typografia do Annuario Commercial, 1905: 70, 114-115, 135, 173, and elsewhere; P. Massano de AMORIM, *Relatório sobre a occupação de Angoche. Operações de campanha e mais serviços realizados. Anno de 1910*, Lourenço Marques, Imprensa Nacional, 1911: 99; A.J. de Mello MACHADO, *Entre os Macuas de Angoche*, Lisbon, 1970: 251, 306; J. CAPELA & E. MEDEIROS, *O tráfico de escravos em Moçambique, 1720-1902*, Maputo, UEM, 1987: 111-113; E. ALPERS, « Towards a History of the Expansion of Islam in East Africa: the Matrilineal Peoples of the Southern Interior » *in* T.O. RANGER & I.N. KIMAMBO, (eds), *The Historical Study of African Religion*, London, Heimenann, 1972: 172-201; M. NEWITT, *A History of Mozambique*, London, Hurst & Co., 1995: 8-12, 187-189; « The Early History of the Sultanate of Angoche », *Journal of African History* XIII (3), 1972: 397-406; « Angoche, the Slave Trade and the Portuguese », *Journal of African History* XIII (4), 1972: 659-672; D. NURSE & T. SPEAR, *The Swahili*, Philadelphia, 1985; J. MIDDLETON, *The World of the Swahili*, New Haven, London, 1992; N. J. HAFKIN, *Trade, Society, and Politics in Northern Mozambique, c. 1753-1913*, PhD thesis, Boston University, 1973; J.F. MBWILIZA, *Towards a Political Economy of Northern Mozambique: the Hinterland of Mozambique Island, 1600-1900*, PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1987; A. & B. ISAACMAN, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982*, Boulder, Westview Press/Hampshire, Gower, 1983: 19-39.

3. Hafkin asserts that Musa Quanto created « an empire stretching from Quizungo to Sangage which lasted beyond his death in 1877. Controlling territory comparable in extent to that of Menelik II, Mutesa or Mirambo, Musa ranks among the largest empire-builders in East African history ». See N. J. HAFKIN, *Trade…, op. cit.:* 334. See also the critique of the theory of « natural connection between trade and state-formation » *in* J.F. MBWILIZA, *Towards…, op. cit.:* 24-26.

approached in this paper by considering the context of local African politics and shared cultural understanding.

The paper presents the history of Angoche in relation to internal African political dynamics, in which the paramount chiefs competed with each other for the opportunities of enrichment offered by the international slave trade. Historians, however, with the exception of perhaps René Pélissier, have tended to assess the nineteenth century history of northern Mozambique through the prism of its relations with the Portuguese[4]. In particular, Angoche has been depicted as a major challenger to the Portuguese imperial designs throughout the nineteenth century. The idea was first brought up by the Portuguese conquerors. The writings of Mousinho de Albuquerque, Massano de Amorim, David Rodrigues and others are replete with references to the African « rebels to our [Portuguese] rule ». « Angoche was one of the oldest and most persistent centers of rebellion against our authority », wrote Texeiro Botelho about the region that had never before experienced any dependence on the Portuguese[5]. The views of these military leaders, however, ought to be considered critically. They portrayed Africans as resisting the rightful rule of the Portuguese in the context of acute European imperial rivalry over Africa and used this portrayal as an ideological and moral device aimed at representing the conquest as a historical continuum[6].

The writings of more liberally inclined military officers, such as Eduardo Lupi, illustrate the diversity of the conquerors' views: « If these people had never before seen the agents of our authority », he wondered, « how can we say *a priori* that they are rebels? »[7]. Nonetheless, historians followed the rhetoric of resistance, which received additional stimulus from the rise of mass nationalism in the 1960-70s that inspired historians to « ransack » the past in order to identify earlier leaders who might serve as role models for the anti-colonial struggle[8]. Hafkin, for example, suggests, « in many ways

4. R. PÉLISSIER, *História de Moçambique: Formação e Oposição, 1854-1928*, Lisbon, Editora Estampa Lda, 2000 [3d ed.], 2 vols, translated from French into Portuguese by Manuel Ruas volumes 1 & 2. See in particular vol. 1: 46-54.
5. Quelimane and Mozambique Island were the only places in Mozambique that were referred to as ostensibly Portuguese commercial *entrepôts*. Teixeira Botelho mentions that up to the eighteenth century, the only place where the Portuguese in fact had some, though limited, control was the Mozambique Island. See J.J. Teixeira BOTELHO, *História militar e política dos portugueses em Moçambique de 1833 aos nossos dias*, Lisbon, Centro Tipografico Colonial, 1936, 38, [2a ed.]; J.F. MBWILIZA, *Towards…*, *op. cit.:* 186.
6. Major changes among the European countries with regard to their colonies affected Portugal as well. The 1884-85 Berlin Conference established the doctrine of « effective occupation », requiring European powers to prove that they effectively ruled and administered those African territories they intended to retain. However, this doctrine did not yield any significant consequences in Mozambique until a conflict arose between Great Britain and Portugal in the late 1880s. The conflict stemmed from Portugal's signing of treaties with France and Germany in 1886 recognizing Portugal's rights to the lands between Angola and Mozambique. Great Britain immediately protested because the Portuguese claims, based on the primacy and antiquity of her presence in southern Africa, interfered with Cecil Rhodes' economic and imperialist plans. In response, Great Britain invoked the concept of « effective occupation », prompting anti-British and pro-military groups in Portugal to pressure the government to adopt an aggressive policy of conquest in Africa. See J.J. Teixeira BOTELHO, *História militar…*, *op. cit.:* 319-323, 79, 333-344, 391-398, 407-611; A. & B. ISAACMAN, *Mozambique…*, *op. cit.:* 19-39; N. J. HAFKIN, *Trade…*, *op. cit.:* 362-364; P.R. WARHURST, *Anglo-Portuguese Relations in South Central Africa, 1890-1900*, London, Longman, 1962; and E. AXELSON, *Portugal and the Scramble for Africa, 1875-1891*, Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press, 1967.
7. E. do Couto LUPI, *Angoche…*, *op. cit.:* 265.
8. See on the debate on resistance in Africa: T.O. RANGER, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-97: A Study in African Resistance*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1967; « Connections

the wars between 1888 and 1913 were only a continuation of centuries of struggle against Portuguese domination »[9]. Close reading of the Portuguese sources, however, suggests that the Portuguese conquest itself took place only in 1910, when a systematic establishment of military posts and communication means, as well as construction of roads and imposition of the hut tax, followed Portuguese military operations. Before this period, the Portuguese had never dominated the region.

The revolts after the establishment of colonial rule with the clear objective on the Africans' side of obtaining independence could be defined as resistance. In the period considered in this paper, when the Portuguese colonial rule had yet to be established, the application of the term « resistance » in qualifying the actions of the Africans seems to be inadequate. I demonstrate in this paper that Angoche's political interests were situated within the arena of local African politics rather than with the Portuguese. The Portuguese were not in a position either to impose their will or to conquer Angoche throughout the nineteenth century. Against this background of internal African politics, Portuguese attempts to establish « effective occupation » amounted to little more than an annoyance for African chiefs, who up to the 1910 were the major political players in the region. It was only through strategic meddling in local politics that the Portuguese were able to insure their survival.

The Problem of the Colonial Encounters in Mozambique

Nancy Rose Hunt's critique of the cliché of *colonial encounters* applies especially well to Mozambique. Hunt points out that this cliché works

> « to skew historical narratives toward one epic-like meeting among two, and two homogeneous groups. A history of a colonial situation should not run the risk of "re-presenting" a singular encounter among colonizers and colonized, but should imagine and render multiple transactions, mediations, and misreadings »[10].

Although this study deals with the historical interactions between the Portuguese and Angoche, those interactions take place on the margins of the main events which are centered on African politics. This study, furthermore, attempts to unravel this alleged dichotomy by unfolding the complex story of multiple transactions and mediations between different actors.

Among all Europeans, the Portuguese were the earliest to come to Africa[11]. During their long-term historical presence of about four hundred

Between "Primary Resistance" Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa », *Journal of African History*, IX (3), 1968: 437-453, 631-641; « The People in African Resistance: a review », *Journal of Southern African Studies* 4: 1, 1977; *Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study*, London, James Currey/ Berkeley–Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1985. A. & B. ISAACMAN, « Resistance and Collaboration in Southern and Central Africa », *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, X (1), 1977: 31-62; *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, op. cit.* See also L. VAIL & L. WHITE, *Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique: A study of Quelimane District*, London – Nairobi – Ibadan, Heinemann, 1980; *Forms of Resistance: Songs and Perceptions of Power in Colonial Mozambique*, paper presented at the Africa Seminar, Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, September, 1983: 3-5.

9. N.J. HAFKIN, *op. cit.:* 364.
10. N. Rose HUNT, *A Colonial Lexicon of Birth, Medicalization, and Mobility in Congo*, Duke University Press, 1999: 160.
11. Vasco da Gama came for the first time in 1498.

years, however, they did not pursue either cultural or military colonization of Africa along the racist and nationalist lines of the modern era[12]. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the Portuguese residents in northern Mozambique (the *moradores* in Portuguese sources) were deeply enmeshed in local politics dominated by Africans[13]. The category of *moradores* included not only the « ethnic » Portuguese, but also Indian, African and mixed-race subjects of the Portuguese Crown[14]. The flexibility of the *moradores* with regard to local African politics enabled them to accrue wealth and made them an « organic » part of the socio-economic and political fabric of the northern Mozambican life. They did not disrupt the internal dynamics of African societies in the way the later colonizers, and especially military conquerors, did[15].

In contrast to the *moradores,* the conquerors represented a new kind of Portuguese in Mozambique[16]. They were motivated by nationalist and racist ideology and fear of losing the Portuguese overseas « possessions » to other European powers. Mousinho de Albuquerque spoke for this generation of conquerors in Africa when he said: « my principal preoccupation was to make effective the Portuguese possessions and domain in every territory that belongs to us by right »[17]. The conquerors tended to come straight from Portugal and had a limited African experience, if any. They tended to have small regard for Africans and criticized the *moradores* for being « kaffrealized » (« Africanized ») and too accommodating to Africans[18]. As a result, instead of unconditional and consistent support for their political and military projects, they stumbled on a diverse and multi-vocal response of the « old » Portuguese who also happened to have family ties and influence over the politics of the *metropole* (Portugal itself as opposed to her colonies)[19].

The Portuguese in the *metropole* also showed ambivalence towards the policy of military conquest, not least because many aristocratic families and mercantile bourgeoisie had been making their fortunes in Africa. These groups were interested in maintaining a certain autonomy of action in the overseas colonies, and were not particularly pleased by greater state control and involvement in the colonies that would inevitably follow the policy of conquests.

On the other hand, the ambitious projects of conquests suggested by the « new » Portuguese, did not inspire immediate interest and support, because

12. R. PÉLISSIER, *História…, op. cit.,* 1: 47, 55-56, 133.
13. *Ibid.:* 58, 133, 159-164 and *passim.*
14. Hafkin identifies the *moradores* (« residents » or « settlers » in Portuguese) and the *homens de chapeu* (literally « men of the hat » in Portuguese, meaning « the nobility ») as non-African residents of the Portuguese territories or Europeans. However, Mbwiliza maintains that *moradores* were merchants who received private concessions to trade in Mozambique from the Portuguese Crown, and that both Portuguese and Indian subjects of the Portuguese Crown married Makwa women. The status of *homens de chapeu* included non-Portuguese people, such as Swahili, Banyans, etc. See N.J. HAFKIN, *op. cit.:* xviii; J.F. MBWILIZA, *op. cit.:* 41, 66, 162-163; R. PÉLISSIER, *História*, 1: 55-56.
15. R. PÉLISSIER, *História…, op. cit.,* 1: 56, 58.
16. *Ibid.:* 171-181.
17. J. Mousinho de ALBUQUERQUE, « A Campanha contra os Namarrais », *in* J. Mousinho de ALBUQUERQUE, (ed.), *Livro das Campanhas*, Lisbon, Divisão de Publicações e Biblioteca. Agência Geral das Colónias, 1935, 1: 113-340.
18. D. RODRIGUES, *A Occupação de Moçambique (1869-1909)*, Lisbon, Ed. Revista de Infantaria, 1910: 33, 63. See also N. J. HAFKIN, *op. cit.:* 363; R. PÉLISSIER, *op. cit.,* 1: 47.
19. See J. Mousinho de ALBUQUERQUE, *Livro das Campanhas, op. cit.:* 89 and *passim;* J.J. Teixeira BOTELHO, *op. cit.*: 75-76; and D. RODRIGUES, *A Occupação*, *op.cit.:* 18, 33-38.

Mozambique had also been marginal to the *metropole*, in comparison to other colonies, such as for example, Angola[20]. This was, according to Pélissier, due to the following factors: 1) a great distance between the *metropole* and Mozambique; 2) insignificant numbers of Whites settled in Mozambique; and, 3) marginality of Mozambique to the Portuguese economy[21].

The continuous discord among the Portuguese with regard to Mozambique, led one of the most aggressive and vociferous mouthpieces of the « new » Portuguese, Mousinho de Albuquerque, to request to be relieved from his post of Governor General of Mozambique in 1898[22]. His suicide in 1902 largely resulted from the political bickering and intrigues of those who did not support his views. Only after 1906 did the « new » Portuguese finally take the upper hand and accomplish a major military offensive in northern Mozambique[23].

The « new » Portuguese were mainly modern-style military career officers, who believed that the deployment of the professionally trained European army and equipment, with modern vessels and newest weaponry, would guarantee the victory[24]. However, the conquest was neither an immediate success nor a single event. First of all, it turned out that Africans also had sophisticated weaponry and war tactics. Second, the numbers of the « new » Portuguese military were insignificant and the supply of personnel and financial support from the *metropole* was scarce and disparate. Soon they realized that the reliance on locals was necessary. Following his first battle and first defeat against the Namarral Makwa in the hinterland of the Mozambique Island, Mousinho de Albuquerque bitterly acknowledged: « I miscalculated the strength of the enemy. The rebels *[sic]* proved to be better warriors than I expected… In the future, we have to recruit and entice more natives. Future wars in Africa must be fought by the hands of the natives »[25]. Consequently, the African auxiliaries of the colonial troops were reinforced by the greater recruitment of the *sepoys* that later were transformed into salaried indigenous soldiers of the colonial army[26].

Mousinho de Albuquerque and other officers also realized that diplomacy and strategic manoeuvering in local politics was inevitable, especially given the significance of the African chiefs (*régulos* in Portuguese sources); without the support of the chiefs, the military operations were doomed[27]. The outcome of these accommodations and adjustments of

20. R. PÉLISSIER, *op. cit.*, 1: 151-62.
21. *Ibid.:* 152.
22. N.J. HAFKIN, *op. cit.:* 403.
23. R. PÉLISSIER, *op. cit.*, 1: 281-304.
24 *Ibid.:* 170-84, 208, and Vol.2, 24, 144.
25. J. Mousinho de ALBUQUERQUE, « A Campanha contra os Namarrais », *op. cit.*
26. *Sepoys* (*cipaios* in Portuguese) were a slave army, an old institution in Mozambique. Young male children or teen slaves that were bought generally from distant mainland territories were given some rudimentary military education by their masters. They then accompanied their masters in military expeditions, as well as hunting or distant trading operations. Armed with firearms, they constituted a numerous *corps* of *ensacas* and *mangas*. In Zambezi *prazos*, *sepoys* became the main support of the *prazeiros*, and were transformed into a privileged military caste, *achikunda*. In effect, they became a professional army. Their numbers in Maganja da Costa reached more than two thousand. Musa Quanto also relied on the *sepoy* slave soldiers. See J.J. Teixeira BOTELHO, *op. cit.:* 93-121; A. ENNES, *Moçambique: Relatorio apresentado ao Governo*, Lisbon, Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, 1893 (reprinted in 1913): 96-107; J. CAPELA, *A República Militar da Maganja da Costa (1862-1898)*, Maputo, Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, Núcleo Editorial da Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 1988: 20-32.
27. Most of the local representatives of the Portuguese rule were captain-majors, elected among the influential Africans, whose obligations with the Portuguese were limited to « respecting

the « new » Portuguese to the local contexts was an increase in the degree to which Africans became involved in the process of the conquest.

Politics of Kinship and Territory

William Murphy and Caroline Bledsoe note that the idiom of first-comers based on the dual principle of land (territory) and kinship provides the basic historical reference point in the political life of the matrilineal Kpelle[28]. This is accurate for the Makwa of the interior and Muslim people of the coast in the modern Nampula Province[29]. As with the Kpelle, here « both kinship and territory constitute semantic resources which are put to rhetorical use in the political process »[30]. In this region, people claim matrilineal clanship, *mahimo* or *maloko* (pl.; sing. *nihimo* or *nloko* in Emakhwa) descending from a common female ancestor symbolically defined as *erukulo* (« a womb ») or *nipele* (« breast »)[31]. This is true for Angoche too, whose *inhapakho* group is constituted of four major clans *(inhandare, inhamilala, inhatide and m'bilinzi)*, the alleged descendants of four sons of the mythical woman founder[32]. The *inhapakho* are the putative first-comers who « own » the land, thus, they are *mwene*[33]. In this capacity, they oversee its distribution to the later arrivals to whose allegiance they have special claims through marriage and kinship relations[34]. The latecomers are expected to receive a portion of land from the first-comers in return for tribute and loyalty. The first-comers give wives, usually sisters or some other relatives, to the important latecomers, who then become their kin.

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the Portuguese sovereignty ». These captain-majors were in fact independent from the Portuguese, especially given that the Portuguese frequently were not able to pay them. Like Mousinho de Albuquerque, David Rodrigues is critical of the « so called indigenous policy ». He cites one of the official Portuguese documents dated May 30, 1900, where the Governor of Mozambique at the time mentions that « indigenous policy means in practice a good friendship between *régulos* [African chiefs] and [the Portuguese] military commandants; it is maintained by some diplomacy and a lot of *saguates* [bribes and gifts to the chiefs]. The money spent was considerable while the results were almost zero ». See J.J. Teixeira BOTELHO, *op. cit.:* 75-86; J. Mousinho de ALBUQUERQUE, « A Campanha… », *op. cit.;* D. RODRIGUES, *op. cit.:* 84; see also, R. PÉLISSIER, *op. cit.,* 1: 202-203.

28. W.P. MURPHY & C.H. BLEDSOE, « Kinship and Territory in the History of a Kpelle Chiefdom (Liberia) » *in* I. KOPYTOFF (ed.), *The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies,* Bloomington – Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1987: 123-147.
29. The information related to the notions of kinship and land (territory), and the first-comers status, among the Koti and Macua is based mostly on oral data, which was collected during fieldwork for a research on women and land rights in Mozambique, part of the women and land in Africa research project under the Law and Religion Programme of the School of Law at Emory University and the African Development and Communication Network (FEMNET). See, Liazzat BONATE « Women's Land Rights in Mozambique: Cultural, Legal, and Social Contexts » *in* L. Muthoni WANYEKI, *Women and Land in Africa: Culture, Religion and Realizing Women's Rights*, London–New York, Zed Books Ltd/Cape Town, David Philip Publishers, 2003: 96-133; see also, C. GEFFRAY, *Nem Pai Nem Mãe: Crítica de Prentesco. O Caso de Macua*, Maputo, Editorial Ndjira/Lisbon, Editorial Caminho, 2000, translated from French into Portuguese by Maria do Rosário Paiva Boléo: 114-15, 125-42.
30. W.P. MURPHY & C.H. BLEDSOE, « Kinship », *op. cit.:* 123.
31. J. CAPELA & E. MEDEIROS, *op. cit.:* 90-92, 116.
32. A.J. Mello MACHADO, *op. cit.:* 391-92.
33. P. Massano de AMORIM, *op. cit.:* 115-116; E. do Couto LUPI, *op. cit.:* 144-148.
34. Geffray depicts how men (especially chiefs) in a matrilineal society gain access to power and create a territory, or a « matrilineal area », through control of marriages (or through the exchange of the women's social statuses), and by protecting reproduction of their lineages through kidnapping other *adelfi*'s women, and thus, guaranteeing a continuity of the matrilineal social hierarchy of women: C. GEFFRAY, *op. cit.*: 125-126, 128-131, 138-143.

The word « first-comer » does not reflect the actual order of arrival in the land, but works as a political ideological device with respect to the foundation and the rights of paramount chieftaincy[35]. The first-comers are usually conquerors violently appropriating the land from the autochthones, consequently expelled or reduced to inferior social status. Some first-comer clans, however, claim that the land was vacant on their arrival.

The Angochian *inhapakho* strategically manipulate two versions of the history of their first-coming status. According to the first version, they are descendants of the Kilwa Shirazi Sultan Hasan, who settled in Angoche Island and whose other brothers settled in Quelimane, Pebane, and the Mozambique Island[36]. The name of the archipelago is Swahili – *Ngoja.* This version establishes the *inhapakho* of Angoche as kin to the other east African Swahili and to Mozambican coastal Muslim people. It underscores their Islamic and Swahili identities. In the second version, the *inhapakho* came from the Namuli Mountains to the Zambezi valley, mythical cradle of all the Makwa, and the founder was a great woman[37]. The ethnic eponym *« Koti »* was derived from the Emakwa word *okhota*, meaning « the end of the journey » or « we have finally arrived ». This version stresses the political idiom of kinship and territory of the first-comers that is important with respect to the « ownership » of land and in dealing with the matrilineal peoples of the interior.

Angoche *inhapakho* are the *mwene* of the Moma region. According to the local oral tradition, after repeated failed attempts of the *inhandare* clan to monopolize power in Angoche, they were forced by the remaining *inhapakho* to leave Angoche and settled in Moma[38]. The remaining three *inhapakho* clans subsequently rotated power among themselves. Angoche *inhapakho* are the *mwene* for the Makwa in their immediate surrounding, and the Sangage coast, because their paramount chiefs are assumed to be latecomers with respect to Angochians, who, in the quality of the first-comers, gave them land and wives[39].

However, the power of a chief was not solely derived from his guns, his control of wealth and people, or from the idiom of territory and kinship and related notions of first-comer status. Africans did not follow passively everything the chiefs said or did. « It must not be supposed that a chief is an unbridled autocrat; he can only rule if he carries the feeling of his tribe »[40]. The history of Angoche and surrounding territories is full of references to « succession disputes ». The successor to the chief was selected among his real or putative maternal nephews/nieces collegially, with the participation of all the clan chiefs and ordinary people.

The chiefs also had symbolic and moral significance. As the descendants of the first-comers, the chiefs represented a symbolic link between the world of the ancestral spirits left behind and the spirits of the new homeland. They had to appease the spirits of the new land if it was vacant, or expel them

35. W.P. MURPHY & C.H. BLEDSOE, « Kinship », *op. cit.:* 129-130; C. GEFFRAY, *op. cit.*: 138-139.
36. This account is based on my fieldwork findings and on E. do Couto LUPI, *op. cit.:* 129-130, 133, 144-148.
37. A.J. Mello MACHADO, *op. cit.*
38. E. do Couto LUPI, *op. cit.:* 163-165.
39. Fieldwork and E. do Couto LUPI, *op. cit.:* 165-171.
40. *A Manual of Portuguese East Africa*, compiled by the Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty, London, Published by His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1920: 96.

together with its previous owners. Through these relations to the spiritual world, the first-comers were responsible for the well-being and the fertility of the land and its inhabitants that was ensured through appropriate ritual. It was from the *epepa*, sacred millet flour of the chiefs' clan, « that the chief's power as guardian of his people and protector against evil spirits was embedded »[41].

Among these matrilineal people, the elder sister of the chief, *pia-mwene*, was a symbolic link between current children and the spirit of their Great Ancestor Mother. As such she presided over important political decisions[42]. Scattering the *epepa*, she asked for answers and guidance from the spirits of ancestors about when to start a war, or how to proceed with criminals. The blessing of the ancestors through her *epepa* ensured plenty of food, and the fertility of women.

Ascendance of Angoche as a Regional Power

Prior to the nineteenth century, Angoche had been involved in the slave trade directed to the Swahili settlements to the north. Unlike Mozambique Island and Quelimane that had well-established relationships with the Makwa of the interior, Angoche's access to the interior was blocked by several new groups of immigrants that settled in her hinterland in the first half of the nineteenth century. The most significant were the Impamella Marundi and the Marrevoni Lomwe Makwa[43]. They blocked Angoche's access to the mainland and took over the control of the caravan routes coming from the hinterland to Angoche, imposing their tolls and tributes on them. The military prowess and conqueror status of these new immigrants diminished the political influence of Angoche as well. Deeper in the interior, the caravan routes and lands full of potential slaves were in the hands of the expanding Yao warrior states and Zambezi *prazeiros* (from *prazos* – « landed estates » in Portuguese).

The growing demand for ivory, rubber, agricultural produce and especially slaves during the nineteenth century, offered an exceptional and relatively quick chance to accrue wealth for ports such as Angoche. Angoche's opportunities were increased even more due to the European anti-slave trade movement. With the signing of the 1815 Vienna Treaty between Portugal and Great Britain on the gradual abolition of slave trade, and with the 1836 Sá Bandeira Decree, followed by the Decree of 1842 prohibiting the exportation of slaves, the ports of Mozambique and Quelimane became difficult destinations for slave traders (*negreiros* in Portuguese)[44].

Many *moradores,* the governors and other Portuguese officials among them, were *negreiros*[45]. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the slaves were exported from Mozambique Island and Quelimane to Brazil,

41. J.F. MBWILIZA, *op. cit.:* 157.
42. P. Massano de AMORIM, *op. cit.:* 101; J.F. MBWILIZA, *op. cit.:* 148-150.
43. E. do Couto LUPI, *op. cit.:* 119-126; A.J. Mello MACHADO, *op. cit.:* 97, 127-133.
44. J. CAPELA, *O escravismo colonial em Moçambique*, Porto, Edições Afrontamento, 12, 1993: 23-35, (« As Armas e Varões »), J.J. Teixeira BOTELHO, *op. cit.:* 157-161; R. PÉLISSIER, *op. cit.,* 1: 52, 57-58, 158-160.
45. J.J. Teixeira BOTELHO, *op. cit.:* 161-164; J. CAPELA, *O escravismo…, op. cit.:* 24-30.

Cuba and the Indian Ocean Islands of Mauritius, and later Réunion[46]. The export slave trade was dominated by the Portuguese, Brazilians, French, and the Sakalava of Madagascar. In 1829, 35 % of the total revenues of the Portuguese administration in Mozambique came from the export slave trade, while 40% came from other activities related to the slave trade[47].

The Portuguese officials stationed in Mozambique wrote reports to the Portuguese king justifying the economic benefits of slave trade[48]. The *moradores* repeatedly and violently revolted against the abolitionist decrees. They even plotted a separatist project for Angola and Mozambique in 1839, aimed at bringing them under the protection of Brazil which still tolerated the slave trade up to 1850[49]. As it became clear that Lisbon would not respond to their grievances, they opted to transport the human merchandise to independent ports, such as Angoche. The existence of ports independent of the Portuguese, affected negatively the Portuguese ports of Quelimane and Mozambique Island, because the prices and taxes in these ports were much higher than those practised in the independent ports. So, ports such as Angoche became a popular destination for other merchandise as well, and greatly benefited from fiscal duties. By 1847, many *moradores* of Mozambique Island had relocated their *feitorias* (« factories » or « commercial establishments » in Portuguese) to Angoche[50].

Nonetheless, the *inhapakho* of Angoche were determined to take control over the caravan routes and create their own mainland bases of slaves supply. They could not, however, enslave people near the coast, because these had become the *inhapakho's* kin mostly through marriage and the rule of arrival successions (first-comers/latecomers)[51]. The sporadic sale of criminals and domestic slaves, and of the meagre numbers of kidnapped could satisfy neither the demands of the market nor the *inhapakho*'s greed. In order to access the riches of the interior, and gain control over the caravan routes, Angoche needed to attain political supremacy on the mainland.

The *inhapakhos* such as Musa Mohammad Sahib Quanto, the *Namuali* (« Fearsome ») (?-1879), were instrumental in bringing the mainland under the aegis of Angoche. Musa Quanto was a maternal brother of the Angoche Sultan, Hassani Yussuf. He travelled and learned extensively during his teens while accompanying his uncle, a *hajji* (a pilgrim to Holy Mecca) and an Islamic proselytizer of *sharifian* descent (descendant of the Prophet Muhammad). Together they went to Zanzibar, Madagascar, the Comoros and to the Mozambican interior along the Rivers Zambezi and Lugenda[52]. It seems that during these journeys Musa became convinced of the possibility of Angoche's expansion and conceived the project to conquer the interior. In previous times, similar projects had been unthinkable, but, with the

46. E. MEDEIROS, *As etapas da escravatura no norte de Moçambique*, Maputo, Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, Núcleo Editorial da Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 1988: 24.
47. J. Mousinho de ALBUQUERQUE, *Livro das Campanhas, op. cit.:* 27.
48. For example, José Capela describes a meeting of the 25 *negreiros* in Quelimane that resulted in producing a letter explaining the benefits of the slave trade. See J. CAPELA, *O escravismo…, op. cit.:* 31.
49. J. CAPELA, *op. cit.:* 23-35; J.J. Teixeira BOTELHO, *op. cit.:* 157-161.
50. J. CAPELA, *op. cit.:* 32; E. MEDEIROS, *As etapas…, op. cit.:* 32-33.
51. Lupi maintains that « only strange people [non kin] can be enslaved »; see E. do Couto LUPI, *Angoche…, op. cit.:* 149.
52. E. do Couto LUPI, *op. cit.:* 183; J. de Azevedo COUTINHO, *As duas conquistas de Angoche*, Lisbon, 1935: 11-29 (« Colecção Pelo Império », 11); J.J. Teixeira BOTELHO, *História…, op. cit.:* 232-239.

widespread circulation of firearms, it became possible to put the project into practice[53].

Hafkin maintains that the migration of the Marrevoni Lomwe group of the Makwa in 1850s into the Angoche hinterland and their conquest of the Nampana-*mwene*, one of the *inhapakho,* precipitated the beginning of Musa's military operations[54]. Musa was selected as the commander-in-chief of Sultan Hassan. At the request of the Nampana-*mwene*, Musa launched a war against the Marrevoni Lomwe Makwa, whom he subsequently defeated. He then restored the power of his fellow *inhapakho*. Musa enslaved many Marrevoni, and brought from their lands ivory and rubber, attracting many followers to his political projects[55].

Among the regional powers, the Zambezi *prazo* of Maganja da Costa threatened Angoche ambitions the most[56]. Maganja da Costa was militarily powerful and agriculturally rich, with big annual fairs that became a popular destination for the caravan routes from the interior[57]. Musa decided to expand the *inhapakho* control into the lands of the *prazeiros* family of da Silva. The pretext for the campaign came again from complaints of one of Angoche's subjects in the region who felt endangered by the Zambezians.

Both the lords of the *prazos* and Musa represented a new kind of leadership emerging in Mozambique. They relied heavily on large slave armies and firearms, and sought to take control over slave trade routes. The ports of the Zambezi *prazos,* especially the Quizungo, also beyond European control, became one of the major rival ports for Angoche[58].

Musa was successful in his mission and annexed some lands of the *prazo* as well as enslaving some of its population[59]. In 1861, João Bonifàcio da Silva, one of the two da Silva brothers who owned the *prazos*, not only re-conquered his family lands, but also triumphantly entered the Sultan's seat on Catamoyo Island in the Angoche archipelago[60]. The Portuguese took advantage of this campaign by offering limited military assistance and Portuguese citizenship to the Afro-Portuguese master of the Maganja da Costa *prazos*, whose riches and army surpassed significantly those of the Portuguese. From the vantage point of local African politics, the presence of the Portuguese was redundant, but it was crucial for Portugal, who claimed

53. In 1787, the Portuguese legalized gun sales. The firearms could be purchased virtually from anybody, Arabs, French, Swahili, British, etc. Some Africans learned to produce gunpowder domestically. Soon, guns and ammunition became the most sought after merchandize and currency. See J. CAPELA & E. MEDEIROS, *O tràfico…, op. cit.:* 80, 105.
54. N.J. HAFKIN, *Trade…, op. cit.:* 322; R. PÉLISSIER, *op. cit.,* 1: 68-70, 88-94, 217-232.
55. *Ibid.*
56. Capela mentions that Maganja da Costa, although considered as comprised of several Portuguese *prazos*, in fact was an independent African political unit, a military republic. The Crown *prazos* were leased to private individuals in 1854, and the control of the Portuguese over these estates, tenuous even before, had completely declined in the nineteenth century. The Maganja da Costa republic extended between the Indian Ocean coast, Quizonga or Tejungo River in the north, Licungo and Lugela Rivers in the south and up to the Lake Nyassa in the interior. See J. CAPELA, *A República…, op. cit.:* 14; and Teixeira BOTELHO, *História…, op. cit.:* 38. R. PÉLISSIER, *História…, ibid,* and vol. 2: 109-118.
57. The Maganja controlled slave trade routes linking the Lake Nyassa region and the Maganja coast. The slaves brought by the Yao were sold at the Maganja fairs, where the Maganjans then took the slaves to the coast and shipped them for export. See E. MEDEIROS, *As etapas…, op. cit.*: 37; R. PÉLISSIER, *op. cit.,* 1.
58. J. CAPELA, *A República…, op. cit.:* 16.
59. E. do Couto LUPI, *Angoche…, op. cit.:* 185; P. Massano de AMORIM, *Relatório…, op. cit.:* 4-5; Azevedo COUTINHO, *As duas conquistas…, op. cit.:* 15-24.
60. E. do Couto LUPI, *op. cit.:* 182, 187-188; P. Massano de AMORIMA, *op. cit.:* 5-8; Azevedo COUTINHO, *As duas conquistas…, op. cit.*

to dominate both Angoche and Maganja da Costa, to strategically attribute Portuguese identity to Zambezi *prazeiros*. The Zambezians were not interested in staying in Angoche permanently, leaving their *prazos* at home unguarded. Before they left, the Portuguese asked them for the transference of the dominion over Angoche to their hands. This request was satisfied, and a small garrison of Portuguese stationed themselves at Parapato on the Angoche mainland. However this garrison was no match for the Angochians, or for Musa Quanto, who soon restored the Sultanate.

Musa wanted Angoche to have sole control over trade. Thus, when Sangage harbored the Banyan Indians who attempted to take over local trade, Musa attacked Sangage[61]. In 1870, Musa attacked the Impamella, who did not want to recognize Angoche's first-comer status, but it was only in 1876 that Musa was able to defeat their paramount chief, the Morla-*mwene*[62].

The Impamella were traditionally comprised of two groups, the *a-nella* and the *a-iadje*, the latter being the lineage of the paramount chief. During the nineteenth century, one of the mainland chiefs subordinate to Angoche gave the fertile lands in the valley between the rivers M'Luli and Lardy in the Angoche hinterland to the *a-nella*[63]. The *a-nella* settled in the middle of the valley and became « owners » of much better lands than the *a-iadje*, and also divided their territory in half. Thus, while one part of the Impamella allied itself to Angoche and recognized *inhapakhos* as first-comers and land-givers, another part continued to battle against it. At the bottom of this controversy, however, lay the desire to control the caravan routes of the interior. The desperation of the Morla-*mwene* made him seek an alliance with the Portuguese. With their tenuous support he pursued his wars against the *inhapakho* that ensured a continuous supply of captives for the slave trade. In the meantime, the *inhapakho* worked on elevating the position of the *a-nella* chief, the Guarnea-*mwene*, who became one of their partners[64].

The Impamella and Makwa Lomwe of the interior became Angoche's pool of slaves, enabling the *inhapakho* to ship their own captives for export. Musa and his agents started appearing with great frequency in the Portuguese reports, attacking Africans of the interior with firearms, kidnapping and taking them to the port of Sangage to be sent to Madagascar[65]. By the 1850s, Musa Quanto was one of the richest men in the region, whose personal profits from duties paid by ships with slave cargoes reached four hundred percent[66].

Following Musa's operations, Angoche became an important destination for slave traders from the interior. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Angoche attracted caravans led by the Yao and the Marave, descending from the territories surrounding Lake Nyassa[67]. In effect, their caravan routes were redirected from Mozambique Island, Quelimane, and the Zambezi ports that were no longer as safe from the abolitionists' control as Angoche. In its immediate hinterland, Angoche took over the control of the caravan routes that passed through the lands of Marundi, Makwa and Impamella, by conquering and subjugating local chiefs. Angoche directed

61. E. do Couto LUPI, *op. cit.:* 206.
62. Azevedo COUTINHO, *As duas conquistas…, op. cit.:* 28-29.
63. E. do Couto LUPI, *op. cit.:* 203-204.
64. *Ibid.*
65. J. CAPELA , *O escravismo…, op. cit.:* 33.
66. J. CAPELA & E. MEDEIROS, *O tráfico…, op. cit.:* 80.
67. *Ibid.*

her own caravans towards the Alto Chire region in Zambezia, conquered by Musa[68]. Angochians played the role of middlemen between the European and Swahili slave traders and the Africans of the interior. The mercantile capital for Angoche came from the French slave traders, and the Swahili of the Comoros and Madagascar, who also provided Musa with firearms and ammunition[69]. From the Comoros and Madagascar, the slaves were mainly exported to the French Islands of Mayotte, Nossi-Bé, and Réunion[70]. Some of these slaves were disguised by *negreiros* as *libres engagés* (contracted free plantation workers)[71].

African chiefs were among the major beneficiaries of the slave trade for export[72]. The involvement of these chiefs in the slave trade caused great distress in the territories of the interior. Nobody could pass through or conduct any business in any land without knowledge of the paramount chief and without paying tolls and tributes. Usually, the *negreiros* requested authorization from the local chief in order to trade in his lands. After receiving the authorization, they would contract locals for capturing slaves or send their own *patamares* (« slave raiding or mercantile group », « a caravan »). The *patamares* were led by a pilot, the *nahota*, and a group of armed slave-soldiers sometimes accompanied by junior male members of the master's family[73]. When the slave-raiders returned, the *negreiro* paid them according to the « quality of the merchandise ». The chief was paid one rupee for each slave head. As a rule, only the paramount chiefs could sell the prisoners of war to the caravans (*patamares*) passing by[74].

Slaves were marked, so that if they escaped, they could be returned to the owner. The solidarity among the chiefs with respect to the slaves was remarkable, and permitted a very small number of the *negreiros* to conduct a very big caravan of slaves over a large distance[75]. Sometimes, however, even the leaders of the caravans, the *nahota*, were themselves sold with the rest of the slaves. The slaves were sold for cattle weaponry, cloth, and money.

Between 1842 and 1902, enslavement by kidnapping became so widespread that the *moradores,* now the masters of the *libertos* (« freed slaves » in Portuguese), preferred to sell them to the *negreiros* rather than lose to kidnappers[76]. Even domestic slaves were involved in kidnapping, since by kidnapping and enslaving others they could buy their own freedom. Although the smaller chiefs organized the kidnapping, the paramount chiefs received their share too, usually consisting of the profits from the sale of captives. The coasts and the river shores were ideal places for the *negreiros* to kidnap people and quickly sail away[77]. The kidnapping became popular among the younger males, organized in small gangs of

68. *Ibid..:* 81.
69. E. MEDEIROS, *As etapas…, op. cit.:* 44.
70. *Ibid.:* 33.
71. J. CAPELA, *O escravismo…, op.cit.:* 111; N.J. HAFKIN, *Trade…, op. cit.:* 371.
72. J. CAPELA & E. MEDEIROS, *O tráfico…, op. cit.:* 78.
73. *Ibid.*
74. *Ibid.*
75. J. CAPELA & E. MEDEIROS, *op. cit.:* 106.
76. From 1854, following the rationale of gradual slave abolition of Sá Bandeira Decree, the Portuguese administration required slave owners to register their slaves with the state in order to control transformation of the slaves into *libertos.* After the acquisition of the status of *libertos,* the former slaves had been legally required to work for some years for their masters. See J. CAPELA & E. MEDEIROS, *op. cit.:* 105-108; J.F. MBWILIZA, *Towards*, *op. cit.:* 193; R. PÉLISSIER, *op. cit.,* 1: 168.
77. J. CAPELA & E. MEDEIROS, *op. cit.:* 105-108.

gunmen in age groups. While the captors kept women, men were mostly sold for export. The kidnapped were kept hidden for some days and then given a magic potion to make them forget their origins and their kin[78]. This ritual indicates the extent to which the Mozambicans attributed importance to kinship relations.

Islam and the Slave Trade

One of the questions that has always puzzled historians of Mozambique is the spread of Islam to the interior during the nineteenth century. Alpers mentions an 1852 report by the Governor of Mozambique that refers to « the extraordinary Muslim advance, its infiltration into the interior, and respective miscegenation »[79]. Alpers further cites Elton, who travelled in the Mozambican coastal hinterland in 1875-76, and the 1890 Nyassa Company survey, both indicating significant inroads of Islam among the mainland Makwa. Musa Quanto apparently had a solid Islamic education through his upbringing with a zealously religious *sharifian* uncle, and his travels around the most important Islamic centers of the East African coast. The Portuguese sources, however, are not clear about the extent of the impact that his conquests of the hinterland, the ascendance of Angoche to the status of regional power, and the slave trade had on the conversion of the people of the interior to Islam.

Hafkin suggests that one of the objectives of Musa Quanto's military operations was proselytizing Islam among the people of the interior, and that he pursued a campaign of a purifying holy war (*jihad*)[80]. Alpers has doubts about Musa's *jihad* mission, but maintains that, « there can be little question that his entire project was embedded » in the Islamic networks of the Swahili world[81]. Nevertheless, he suggests that African chiefs were instrumental in converting the mainland to Islam, and that they were the first converts. Mbwiliza argues against Alpers' view and maintains that the younger male age groups had challenged the power of the elders by taking up the Islamic faith[82]. Both Alpers and Mbwiliza underscore the externality of Islam to the cultural understandings of the mainland people, and seek an explanation for their conversion in the possible cosmological parallelism between the local culture and Islam. Thus, Mbwiliza and Alpers seek to understand Islamic conversion of the interior from the perspectives of their psychological and cultural predispositions (the *habitus*)[83].

This paper shares Alpers' view that the chiefs were instrumental in the conversion of the hinterland people. However, the evidence to suggest that the cosmological parallelisms between African « traditional » religion and Islam served as a vehicle for the conversion has yet to be uncovered. It seems plausible to approach the conversion from the standpoint of historical contexts of the nineteenth century politico-economic changes and from the

78. *Ibid.:* 107-109.
79. E. ALPERS, « East Central Africa », paper presented at the Conference on the Writing of the History of Islam in Africa, the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 1997, 6, June: 15-20.
80. N.J. HAFKIN, *Trade…, op. cit.:* 341.
81. E. ALPERS, « East Central Africa », *op. cit.:* 5-6.
82. J.F. MBWILIZA, *Towards…, op. cit.:* 141-158.
83. P. BOURDIEU, *The Logic of Practice*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1990 (Translated by Richard Nice).

perspectives of practical social uses of kinship for political purpose as suggested by Pierre Bourdieu[84]. According to Bourdieu, « Kinship relationships are a form of the practices that produce, reproduce or use them by reference to practical functions, are the products of strategies oriented towards the satisfaction of material and symbolic interests and organized by reference to a particular type of economic and social conditions »[85]. In the context of competition for the slave trade, kinship through marriage among the chiefs of the coast and the interior became important. Thus, it seems that the coastal Muslim chiefs expanded Islam to the interior using the old political idiom of territory and kinship, by giving coastal Muslim wives to the mainland chiefs in the quality of the first-comers within the new politico-economic context.

Musa's main objective was to gain control over the slave trade by creating networks throughout the region. In order for the caravans to pass peacefully from the interior through different chiefdoms all the way to the coast, he had to build up a web of allies through conquest and kinship relations. He invoked the idiom of the first-comers to the mainlanders, and opted for wife- and land-giving tactics, such as the example of the Impamella *a-nella* suggests. Musa succeeded in this strategy because the migration of people in Mozambique during the nineteenth century was from the mainland to the coast. These migrants could have acquired first-comer status to the disadvantage of the coastal ruling families if they had managed to overwhelm the coastal population. However, Angoche's *inhapakho* had a geographical advantage because their islands were difficult to access by non-sailing mainlanders. Furthermore, the relative prosperity of the coast, originating from involvement in the international slave trade, made them able to acquire slave-soldiers and firearms with comparative ease. Not only could they protect themselves effectively, but they could also pursue aggressive politics of conquest on the mainland. For their part, the chiefs of the interior also sought for ways of taking part in the slave trade and setting up relations with the coast, the final destination of the slaves to be exported.

Despite the fact that the *inhapakho* were the *mwene* of the lands near the coast, they could not claim the *mwene-ship* of the deep interior. But the importance of land became secondary to the slave trade, and the idiom of first-comers was restructured in order to suit the new politico-economic conjunctions. Angoche *inhapakho* became symbolic land-givers and first-comers for the deep interior in the capacity of the supreme *mwene*. The importance of the local chiefs grew in relation to their proximity to the coast, culminating in Angoche as the arch-chief in the role of the gatekeeper of the international trade. The process of wife-giving and land-giving, then, was directed from coast to the interior. However, Mozambican coastal people required their Muslim womenfolk to be married to Muslim men. Therefore, the chiefs that took wives from the coast had to accept Islam. These chiefs, in turn, gave their women in marriage to other mainland chiefs, converting them to Islam as well[86].

84. *Ibid.:* 166-182.
85. *Ibid.:* 166-167.
86. The Portuguese sources underscore the kinship relations between Angoche and the people of the mainland, on the one hand. On the other, the Angochians were referred to as *muinhiy (mwene)* by the nearest mainlanders, suggesting their recognition of their alleged superiority. See J. de Azevedo COUTINHO, *Memórias de um marinheiro e soldado de África.* Lisbon, Livraria Bertrand, 1941: 31-32; E. do Couto LUPI, *Angoche…, op. cit.:* 178-179.

Angoche soon presided over a complex network of slave trading chiefs covering the whole region. This network resembled a centralized state, but it was not, because despite the fact that the network was a new political arrangement, it was based on the old principle of kinship and territory. The supreme *mwene* controlled all the external transaction of the subordinate chiefs, such as those related to long-distance caravan routes, reception of the foreigners, and questions of war and peace[87]. They also presided over criminal courts to solve *milandos* (disputes and complaints) and the general assembly of all the subordinate chiefs. The political system was conceived of as consisting of « nested » pyramidal hierarchical structures, and the subordinate chiefs as well as ordinary people were responsible in informing the paramount about all the unusual or suspicious occurrences[88].

The chiefdoms incorporated into the slave-trading network became Muslim. They captured caravan routes, and collected tolls and tributes from passing caravans. The chiefs that were not incorporated into the network were not Muslim and became a target for enslavement[89]. In this context, Angoche's position had also been strengthened by the fact that the *inhapakho* were the descendants of the Shirazi Swahili. Angoche became a regional center of Islam from which literacy in Swahili or in Arabic script in local languages spread into the mainland. By the second half of the nineteenth century, all the major chiefs of the interior were corresponding in local languages using this script or in Swahili[90]. Muslim teachers *(mwalim),* and itinerant preachers began crisscrossing the region. The first Sufi order, the Rifa'iyya, expanded to the rest of Mozambique from Angoche also[91].

I think that one of the main ideological attractions of Islam was related to the effectiveness of Islamic diviners, charms and amulets. The Islamic charms became seen by the ordinary people as an additional « secret knowledge » that strengthened the chiefly power together with that of the « traditional » healer (*m'culucuana*) and diviner (*echaco*). Extraordinary wealth and the success of the Muslim chiefs involved in the slave trade probably served as the most obvious proof of the magical and sacred powers of Islam. For example, the chiefs and their soldiers wore protective amulets of Qur'anic verses (*naparrama*). Mousinho de Albuquerque seized a bag of papers with Arabic writings from his local guide and interpreter

87. E. do Couto LUPI, *op. cit.:* 129-134; P. Massano de AMORIM, *op. cit.:* 100-103.
88. E. do Couto LUPI, *op.cit.;* P. Massano de AMORIM, *op. cit.*
89. The question of how lesser chiefs or individuals operated the Islamic identity in order not to be enslaved, or take part in the slave trade requires further investigation.
90. ALPERS, *Towards a History…, op. cit.:* 189.
91. According to informants in Mozambique Island and Angoche during my fieldwork in 1999-2000 for a different research project, the *mawlid* (devotional celebration and poetry in honor of the Prophet Muhammad's birthday) Rifa'i was first to appear among the Sufi practices, and spread from Angoche to other territories of Mozambique. They mentioned that Farallahi and his warriors were especially fond of this *mawlid*. Usually it is assumed, following de Carvalho's article, that only Shadhiliyya (with three branches) and Qadiriyya (with five branches) existed in Mozambique. De Lemos described *mawlid* Rifa'i in the Mafalala quarter of the Maputo city, inhabited by the immigrants from the Nampula Province, mostly the Makwa. Azevedo Coutinho also seems to have witnessed *mawlid* Rifa'i near Angoche in 1887 accompanied by the *reua* drum or perhaps influenced by the *reua* dance. Alpers identifies Azevedo Coutinho's description with *lewa* spirit possession dance known from Zanzibar and the Persian Gulf. See A. Pinto de CARVALHO, « Notas para historia das confrarias islâmicas na Ilha de Moçambique », *Arquivo. Boletim do Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique* (Maputo), 4, October 1988: 59-67; A. de LEMOS, « Reviver a Ilha, na Mafalala », *Arquivo* (Maputo), 4, October 1988: 49-59; Azevedo COUTINHO, *Memorias…, op. cit.:* 67; ALPERS, « East Central Africa », *op. cit.:* 6.

Mohammad Sharmadan[92]. These contained Qur'anic verses written with the purpose of defeating the Portuguese in their attempts to conquer the Namarral Makwa.

The Power of the *Mwene*

The « new » Portuguese viewed the world as revolving around them, even though their own numbers in Mozambique were still insignificant. They had evaluated every event and every person against the background of their own interests and projects in the region. From this perspective, there were only two kinds of people that existed in Mozambique – those who were pro and those who were contra the Portuguese. These views were later adopted uncritically in Mozambican historiography. Most of the events, however, were the manifestations of the internal dynamics of local African politics. Chiefs fought and competed with each other, or made diplomatic arrangements among themselves in order to take advantage of the opportunities resulting from politico-economic changes of the nineteenth century. The « old » Portuguese knew the rules and spin of these political games. The « new » Portuguese learned as they proceeded on the terrain. Furthermore, Africans were accustomed to deal with the « old » Portuguese, and frequently could not adequately interpret the actions of the « new » Portuguese. Hence, there were what Nancy Hunt calls « misreadings » on both sides.

In particular, the « new » Portuguese did not understand the principle of correlation between the territory and kinship. As a result, they underestimated the power of chiefs. Only a few, such as Eduardo Lupi, who had an interest in anthropology, recognized this power. He comments that the Africans venerated their chief's authority and never discussed the politics of paramount chiefs with strangers. The issues concerning the interests of the majority of people in the territories of paramount chiefs were discussed only in the councils under the auspices of the latter. The paramount chiefs were consulted on the questions of war and peace[93]. The Africans also never left their own settlements, or entered the lands of others without explicit authorization from the chiefs. *A Manual of Portuguese East Africa*, compiled by the British Naval Division, also maintains that: « a native chief expects permission to be asked of him by anybody who passes through or encamps in his land, and presents of satisfactory value to be offered to him »[94].

Some of the « new » Portuguese who ignored the territorial rights of the paramount chiefs suffered the consequences. In 1895, the Portuguese captain of the Parapato decided to build a new military post in the mainland[95]. Without consulting the *mwene*, he proceeded to place wooden sticks in order to delineate the confines of the future station. Suddenly, some locals approached his men and began removing the sticks. The Portuguese and

92. J. Mousinho de ALBUQUERQUE, « A Campanha contra os Namarrais », *op. cit.:* 83.
93. E. do Couto LUPI, *Angoche, op. cit.:* 129, 134; P. Massano de AMORIM, *Relatório…, op. cit.:* 22-23.
94. *A Manual…, op. cit.:* 96.
95. E. do Couto LUPI, *Angoche…, op.cit.:* 226.

their African auxiliaries resisted, but were quickly subdued. Beaten, they were chased away, leaving behind their military ammunition.

In 1902, engineer Pães d'Almeida and ex-sergeant Pitta Simões went to visit the Maca-*mwene*, one of the smaller chiefs of the Mogovollas[96]. While on the road, they received repeated warnings from the paramount chief, the Cubula-*mwene,* that he had not authorized his subaltern chief to let them enter his lands. The Portuguese ignored these warnings. Finally, in Buela, they were surrounded and killed by the armed people following the instructions of the Cubula. It is possible that the Cubula particularly disliked the Portuguese, but in principle anybody could have suffered the similar fate. Nonetheless, the « new » Portuguese interpreted the incident as directed against their « race » and their « rule ». In the following years, the names of these two victims were repeatedly invoked in Portuguese calls to « avenge the death of our brothers and co-citizens »[97].

Lupi also mentions that the chiefs followed a very complex protocol while visiting each other[98]. The warnings about the intent of the visit were sent beforehand, followed by the negotiations and exchange gifts. The chiefs enjoyed a complicated ceremonial of courtesy. In contrast, the « new » Portuguese showed little respect to the chiefs. The following examples attest the contest for power between the Portuguese and African chiefs.

In February 1907, the Portuguese captain of Parapato (renamed then « António Ennes ») invited the Morla-*mwene* to visit him in response to his alleged intention to submit to the Portuguese[99]. Morla took a long time to come, because he thought that his position required a continuing negotiation on the visit accompanied by the mutual exchange of gifts. Alleging that he was too afraid of his rival paramount Guarnea's machinations to travel, he sent in March 1907 his uncle Nacuacua-*mwene*, who was told by the Portuguese that Morla had to come in person. A few days later, he sent another three important Impamella who stayed for some time in Angoche. Morla then said he could not come because his envoye had not returned.

Finally, in March 1908 after much persuasion, the Morla-*mwene* visited the Portuguese captain. His entourage was comprised of five of his principal chiefs, thirty armed men, and thirty of his womenfolk. On his arrival, the Morla was offered an *esteira* (straw mat) instead of a stool or chair, the act tantamount to insult. Perhaps the Portuguese captain did not know about the local protocol, or maybe he wanted to show who was in charge. In any case, the Morla was reluctant to sit on the mat, because the incident « made him wonder », remarks Massano de Amorim reporting the anecdote[100]. The Morla, nevertheless, spent three days in António Ennes, receiving gifts and discussing the politics with the Portuguese. Although he was thought to be a firm Portuguese ally, the following year he was reconciled with the Guarnea-*mwene*.

Mousinho de Albuquerque reported a similar episode that took place during his 1896-97 military campaigns against the Namarral Makwa of the Mozambique Island's mainland[101]. The paramount chief of the Namarral,

96. *Ibid.:* 226 and 70-71.
97. *Ibid.:* 73-74.
98. *Ibid.*
99. P. Massano DE AMORIM, *op. cit.:* 34-35.
100. *Ibid.*
101. J. Mousinho de ALBUQUERQUE, « A campanha… », *op. cit.:* 331-332.

Mucuto-*mwene*, expressed a desire to submit to the Portuguese but did not come to meet their commander. After weeks of sending different people, he finally was brought, carried by his slaves, and alleging that he was old and ill. In fact, being carried by slaves symbolized status and power. Eight hundred armed men accompanied him.

The Conquest

In the second half of the nineteenth century, as Angoche had learned that without access to the mainland it would not benefit from the opportunities of international trade, a number of the *inhapakho* had become increasingly involved in the politics of the mainland. While the Sultan Ibrahim continued to guard Angoche's maritime interests from his seat on Catamoyo Island, Farallahi (Farelay in Portuguese sources), opted to settle on the mainland. Omar bin Nacogo Farallahi[102], Musa Quanto's second nephew and the brother of the Angoche Sultan Ibrahim, controlled the hinterland interests of Angoche by launching relationships with new chiefs. It seems that by this time, the *inhapakho* sought not only slaves and the control of the caravan routes, but land as well. This was due to the continuous European assaults on the slave trade from the sea and Parapato that restricted the profits of the *inhapakho* from slave exports. Furthermore, the increasing importance of agricultural technical products in the international market elevated the value of land[103]. In this context, northern Mozambicans started reversing the process of the *mwene*-ship from the coast to the mainland, because the coastal lands were scarce and poor as opposed to the rich and abundant lands of the interior.

The mainland *mwene* were gradually gaining the position of the supreme *mwene* with respect to the coast by using the principle of territory and kinship, and by transforming into literal land- and wife-givers to the *inhapakho*. It seems that Farallahi, for example, had several wives in different chiefdoms through which he had access to the local lands. Among the matrilineal societies of northern Mozambique, the land was the collective property of the clans. However, in this region, women were never deprived

102. No data is available on his birth and death dates.
103. Amorim mentions that Farallahi imposed his tolls on the Makwa caravans bringing to the coast rubber and groundnuts for sale. Mbwiliza describes that at the end of the nineteenth century, Mozambique was exporting rubber. By the turn of the century, « top on the list of exports were groundnuts, copra, beans and oilseeds. These together with the traditional staple foodstuffs were the major preoccupation of the Makwa during this period of transitions, and indeed one of the positive changes noted by contemporary observers was the involvement of both men and women in agriculture ». See P. Massano de AMORIM, *Relatório…*, *op. cit.:* 18; J.F. MBWILIZA, *Towards…*, *op. cit.:* 219.



Farallahi, *in* AMORIM, *Relatorio*…



Sultan Ibrahim, Farallahi, and Cubula-mwene

of land, and they tended to stay within the territory of their own clans, while men moved to the lands of their wives, because the residence of the married, as a rule, was uxorilocal[104].

By the 1890s, Farallahi and other *inhapakho* were distributed on the mainland ranging from Angoche up to Lake Nyassa on the west, to the Zambezi in the southwest and to the lands of the Namarral Makwa in the northwest[105]. During Mousinho de Albuquerque's 1896-97 campaigns against the Namarral Makwa, on the mainland of Mozambique Island, Sultan Ibrahim and Farallahi each sent to the Namarral paramount chief, Mucuto-*mwene*, fifty *inhapakho* accompanied by their respective slave soldiers[106].

Despite constant European attempts to curtail the slave trade along the coast, Angoche continued to be one of the ports over which European control was still less significant than in other similar places of the northern Mozambique. Despite the sporadic appearance of the Portuguese and other European vessels in the port and the limited number of the Portuguese military stationed in Parapato, slaves continued to be exported from Angoche[107]. Moreover, the Africans used small and easily manageable *pangaios*, difficult to detect or capture by the Europeans[108]. Thus, the *inhapakho* and other chiefs of the interior accompanied by the armed youth and *sepoy* slaves, continued to raid the mainland for slaves when the situation became propitious.

Farallahi's objective, however, was not only to direct the hinterland caravans to Angoche, and generate new revenues by taking new lands in the interior, but also to gather tribute on the roads leading to the coast. He set up a post near Parapato to collect tolls from the caravan traders and offered protection in exchange for tribute to those who needed to go to the interior, inflicting great financial losses on the Portuguese. The Portuguese, frequently cut off from the mainland, became dependant on the Farallahi's will. He perceived, however, that he acted in his own right as an *inhpakaho*, therefore the *mwene* of the territory.

The Portuguese presented their history of Parapato as an epic of confrontations between two worlds, two forces, the African and the Portuguese. They also consistently called the small garrison at Parapato representatives of « our authority and our rule ». But, this small garrison was vulnerable to African attacks, and lived most of the time abandoned and in isolation from other Europeans[109]. David Rodrigues mentions that it lived mixed with local population and became « completely *kaffrealized* »[110]. Massano de Amorim, while reporting on the situation of the Macuana and Angoche between 1906 and 1910, stresses that the local population had very

104. E. do Couto Lupi, *Angoche…*, *op. cit.:* 143.
105. Azevedo COUTINHO, *Memórias…*, *op. cit.:* 469.
106. P. Massano de AMORIM, *op. cit.:* 16-17; J. Mousinho de ALBUQUERQUE, « A Campanha contra os Namarrais », *op. cit.:* 85.
107. R. PÉLISSIER, *op. cit.,* 1: 254-324, and 2: 125, 157.
108. Mbwiliza mentions that, « with their small vessels Arab and Swahili traders preferred to sell their slaves to the nearby islands of Comoro and Mauritius ». Hafkin identifies *pangaio* as « small wooden short distance ships, also generic term for Arab and Swahili craft ». See J.F. MBWILIZA, *Towards…*, *op.cit.:* 45 and N.J. HAFKIN, *Trade…*, *op. cit.:* xviii.
109. Hafkin mentions that « Through the whole of the period until 1900 they [the Portuguese] were isolated at two tiny outposts on Angoche Islands », see N.J. HAFKIN, *Trade…*, *op. cit.:* 349.
110. D. RODRIGUES, *A occupação…*, *op. cit.:* 33, 38.

little regard for the Portuguese[111]. He mentions a chronic lack of the most « insignificant resources » among the Portuguese; a fact that not only was noticed by the locals, but also invited their derision.

Despite the Portuguese political rhetoric of domination, they were often reduced to the status of *de facto*, if not *de jure*, clients to local rulers[112]. The Portuguese frequently played minor roles within the arena of local politics, which continued to be dominated by powerful African chiefs into the early twentieth century. Up to 1910, the attempts to consolidate Portuguese sovereignty in this region were futile and the chiefs were still independent[113].

Farallahi, however, was irritated by the Portuguese presence, not least because they constantly interrupted his shipments of slaves from the coast. Together with the *mwene* Muapala, he attacked the Parapato station in 1890[114]. Fortunately, the approaching Portuguese vessel, named *Tamega*, saved the day for the Portuguese. Following Farallahi's flight, various lesser *mwene* came to submit to the Portuguese, including those of Sangage, Mutucute, Inhamitade, and others. In the face of this massive exodus of the *mwene* from the rank and file of his supporters, Farallahi decided to submit to the Portuguese too out of a strategic desire to buy some time. Thus, he signed a treaty with the Portuguese, who left him alone for a while after this act. During the following year, Farallahi visited the *mwene* of the region, including those who had officially submitted to the Portuguese. As a result of his negotiations with them, Farallahi gained the upper hand in the regions again. He travelled extensively signing agreements with the *mwene* of the Namarral, Marave and others, situated beyond the mainland of Angoche.

Finally, in 1902 he camped 2 km away outside Parapato, and sent Muapala, the *régulo* of the Marrua, to announce to the Portuguese that he was coming to « lie down in his own bed »[115]. At the same time, Farallahi was proclaimed the Sultan of the nearest Angoche mainland territories, M'Luli, under the name of Monga-*mwene*. Farallahi, commanding the people of Boila, Marrua, M'zere, M'lay and Selege, descended to Parapato and burned and pillaged the station-village. The desperate Parapato inhabitants were saved by a French vessel, that later reported the occurrence to European media mocking the myth of the Portuguese dominion in Mozambique[116]. Farallahi was now stationed again near Parapato.

In 1903, the new captain of Angoche, José Augusto Cunha, occupied Boila with the help of the nine lesser chiefs of the area[117]. These chiefs collaborated with him for different reasons, but some were sworn enemies of the *inhapakho*. The majority, however, received the payment of « tribute » from the Portuguese in the form of regular wages and various gifts. For example, the *shaykh* of Moginquale was promised 6000 *reais* of annual payments[118]. The soldiers of these chiefs, who served as the auxiliaries for

111. P. Massano de AMORIM, *Relatório…*, *op. cit.:* 151.
112. N.J. HAFKIN, *op. cit.:* 359-360; R. PÉLISSIER, *op. cit.,* 1: 56-58.
113. *Cartas de Mousinho de Albuquerque ao Conde de Arnoso,* Lisbon, Comissão Nacional para as comemorações de centenário de Mousinho de Albuquerque, 1957: 190; D. RODRIGUES, *op. cit.:* 85.
114. P. Massano de AMORIM, *op. cit.:* 18-20; E. do Couto LUPI, *op. cit.:* 212-213.
115. P. Massano de AMORIM, *op. cit.:* 21.
116. *Ibid.*: 21.
117. *Ibid.:* 23.
118. D. RODRIGUES, *A occupação…*, *op. cit.:* 62-63.

the Portuguese troops, were also rewarded either in money or in kind, but most of all, they were allowed to pillage and rob freely.

After devastating Boila, Cunha proceeded to Catamoyo Island from which Sultan Ibrahim escaped. Cunha burned down the houses and the mosques of the Sultan and of his *wazir*, the Etite-*mwene,* and desecrated local cemeteries[119]. Then, he proclaimed the deposition of the Sultan. In retaliation, the Sultan, Farallahi, and his allies started harassing the Portuguese and raiding the lands of the chiefs who collaborated with them. The Portuguese military commander of Moma was subjected to the payment of tributes[120]. All the caravans coming from the interior to the Portuguese posts were assaulted and the *sepoys* that served as couriers between different Portuguese posts were burned alive. The telegraphic cords were cut down, boats and vessels, as well as fishermen, were attacked at sea and Portuguese traders were robbed[121].

In 1903, Eduardo Lupi launched an operation by land from Moma in the direction of Parapato in order to restore « order » and the position of the Portuguese[122]. The settlements were burned down one after another. A situation somewhat similar to the previous balance of forces was restored and maintained until 1906, when the Portuguese conceived of a project of total and effective occupation of the region. Pedro Massano de Amorim, Ernesto Vilhena, and other Portuguese officials together drew up a new plan of military operations consisting of simultaneous attacks from six regions parallel to the coast[123]. The objectives of these operations Massano de Amorim described as following:

> « To make gentiles [Africans] submit, to eliminate rebellious chiefs, to open caravan routes for [the Portuguese trade], to establish military posts, to make our [the Portuguese] dominion effective, to promote the payment of the taxes, to open new ways of communication, to force [the Africans] of the interior to produce a determined type of agricultural products, …and to educate the natives in order to make them useful [to the Portuguese] »[124].

After four years of preparation and study, Amorim's military conquest took place in 1910. Farallahi and his troops joined those of Impamella, the Mogovolla, the Marave, the chiefs of Mossuril, and others from the lands extending from Moma to Nakala[125]. Having experienced the Portuguese war tactics, many people abandoned their settlements and hid in the *matto* (forest), so that the Portuguese burned empty huts.

This time the Portuguese conducted a very systematic and well-organized operation. The « new » Portuguese had now gained enough experience and knowledge, and were also supported well by the government that felt an urge to delineate the borders of its colonies due to the pressure and threat from the British[126]. Besides, many lands and ports had already been subjugated, especially in southern Mozambique and the

119. P. Massano de AMORIM, *Relatório…, op. cit.:* 62-63.
120. *Ibid.*
121. *Ibid.:* 26-35.
122. E. do Couto LUPI, *Angoche…, op. cit.:* 26-35.
123. P. Massano de AMORIM, *op. cit.*: 195-216.
124. *Ibid.:* 210.
125. *Ibid.:* 265-266.
126. Especially following the 1884-85 Berlin Conference and the 1890 Salisbury proposal on the creation of the borders between the Portuguese and British colonies in Africa. The Treaty between Portugal and Lord Salisbury was signed in 1891. See J.J. Teixeira BOTELHO, *História…, op. cit.:* 351-398.

region of the Zambezi. As the Portuguese troops proceeded, the paramount chiefs continued to confront them, while more and more of the lesser chiefs formally recognized the Portuguese, furnishing them with people and support[127]. Some of the paramount chiefs were killed in battle, but the most important ones were imprisoned. First among them to be captured was Cubula, then Guarnea, and finally, Farallahi and Sultan Ibrahim, all later deported to Guiné[128].

* * *

The aim of this study was to reconstruct the history of the expansion of Angoche onto the mainland during the nineteenth century through the perspectives of major politico-economic changes in the region, especially those connected with its involvement in the international slave trade. By concentrating on local African politics, the study challenges two major assumptions in historiography of northern Mozambique: first, that Angoche directed its interests towards the Swahili world while its political strategies with regard to the mainland were only of the predatory and parasitic character of a slave raider. Second, that Angoche's political priorities and activities were aimed at resisting the Portuguese who became Angoche's major political rivals.

By revisiting the historical processes of the political expansion of Angoche into the mainland that was spearheaded by Musa Quanto and Farallahi, the paper showed that the leaders of Angoche viewed themselves, and acted, as an integral part of the mainland. They invoked a political idiom of kinship and territory, which was shared and understood by both the mainland and the coast. Their skilful and strategic political manoeuvering assured them leadership among the paramount chiefs of the interior and let them successfully create networks of trade and reciprocity that extended throughout the region. This opened the door to greater benefits from the opportunities offered by the international slave trade and the control over the caravan routes.

The reassessment in this study of the situation of the Portuguese in the region showed that they were not uniform as a category or a group, and that overall they did not pursue clearly defined imperial designs throughout the nineteenth century. This study showed that the Portuguese views with respect to the policy of « effective occupation » were not homogeneous. This was not only due to the fact that the *modus operandi* and *modus vivendi* of the « old » and the « new » Portuguese in Mozambique differed significantly, but also because the Portuguese simply did not have the means to accomplish these projects until the early twentieth century.

The study showed that despite their rhetoric of superiority and dominance, the Portuguese, as political actors, were only secondary to the powerful African chiefs, such the *inhapakho* of Angoche. Therefore, to

127. P. Massano de AMORIM, *Relatório, op. cit.:* 328-331.
128. *Ibid.:* 329-331.

describe the relationship between the Angochians and the Portuguese during the nineteenth century as one of conquest and resistance is not only unwarranted, but is factually inaccurate. Historical interactions between the Portuguese and Africans in this region were not dichotomous either from racial, cultural or political standpoints. Rather, they involved a complex story of multiple transactions and mediations between different actors on both sides. These interactions, and the lessons learned from them, assured subsequently the success of the « new » Portuguese in their attempts to conquer the region in 1910 and subjugate its population to colonial rule.

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